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The Moral from Sorrell:
Educate, Don’t Legislate
George R. Gooch,† J. James Rohack††
& Marisa Finley†††
Abstract
This Article argues that in response to the United States Supreme
Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., state legislators should
refrain from enacting prescription confidentiality laws and instead
implement policies supporting academic detailing, a form of continuing
medical education in which trained health professionals such as physicians,
registered nurses, advanced practice nurses, and pharmacists provide
evidence-based information about prescription drugs to prescribers.
According to Sorrell, pharmaceutical companies may freely use
physicians’ prescribing data to better promote, or “detail,” products to
physicians without government interference. While pharmaceutical
companies may profit from detailing drugs to physicians, detailing
increases health care costs for patients and negatively affects patient
health outcomes. These problems motivated Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont to enact prescription confidentiality laws that banned the use
of information about the prescribing habits of physicians to help market
drugs to physicians.
Recent state attempts to stop drug detailing to physicians have been
found to violate the First Amendment. This Article provides a history
and background on the pharmaceutical-detailing process and analyzes
recent legal decisions relating to prescription confidentiality. It concludes
that academic detailing is a viable solution to the negative effects of
pharmaceutical detailing and is consistent with the First Amendment.
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Introduction
Physicians often work upwards of eighty hours each week.1 Between
seeing patients, filling out paperwork, and managing a practice, physicians have little time to research the drugs they prescribe. Although
1.

Shirley S. Wang, New Rx for Young Doctors: Shorter Work Day,
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703900004575325130511028968.html.
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physicians can seek drug information from any number of sources—
including colleagues, journal articles and advertisements, direct mail,
commercial sources, Medicare updates, conferences, and continuing
medical education activities2—they rely on information from pharmaceutical sales representatives (drug reps).3 Drugs reps are mindful of
physicians’ limited time and offer them succinct drug information.4 This
direct-to-physician marketing is hugely successful; indeed, it is a highly
profitable form of advertising for drug companies.5 While research shows
that physicians understand the conflict of interest between marketing
and patient care, they nevertheless frequently communicate with drug
reps.6 In 2005, the average primary care physician interacted with
twenty-eight drug reps each week; the average specialist interacted with
fourteen.7
Drug reps promote their products to physicians in offices and
hospitals through a process called detailing. Detailing is a marketing
technique used to educate physicians about a pharmaceutical company’s
products in hopes that physicians will prescribe them more.8 Drug reps,
also known as detailers, bring physicians drug samples and medical
studies explaining the advantages of their company’s products.9
Detailers can market a particular drug more effectively when they
have information about doctors’ unique prescribing practices, or
“prescriber-identifying data.” Using prescriber-identifying data, detailers
can target physicians who adopt new drugs quickly, regularly prescribe
competitors’ drugs, or prescribe large quantities of drugs for particular
2.

Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-toPhysician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative
Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 797 (2005).

3.

See Pew Prescription Project & Community Catalyst, Academic Detailing:
Evidence-Based Prescribing Information, COMMUNITY CATALYST 1 (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.communitycatalyst.org/
doc_store/publications/Academic_Detailing_Fact_Sheet.pdf [hereinafter
Prescription Project] (describing the amount of resources the
pharmaceutical industry expends on soliciting).

4.

See Jerry Avorn, Academic Detailing: An Introduction, NAT’L RES. CTR.
ACAD. DETAILING 9 (2011), http://www.narcad.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/Avorn-AD-talk-for-web-1-15-2011.pdf.
FOR

5.

J. A. Greene, Pharmaceutical Marketing Research and the Prescribing
Physician, 10 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 744 (2007) (describing the
history of data mining from its origins in the mid-twentieth century).

6.

Prescription Project, supra note 3, at 1.

7.

Rayna Herman & Ashley Mahoney, 2005 Access Report: The Current
State of Pharma Sales, PHARMACEUTICAL REPRESENTATIVE, July 1, 2005,
at 16.

8.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).

9.

Id.
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conditions.10 Because detailing is an expensive process, pharmaceutical
companies typically use it to promote expensive brand-name, patentprotected drugs.11 Once a brand-name drug’s patent expires, cheaper,
generic alternatives are manufactured and sold.12 Because of their lower
profit margins, generic drugs are not marketed by drug reps.13
Pursuant to federal law, pharmacies receive prescriber-identifying
data when processing prescriptions.14 Several pharmacies sell this
information to data miners, also known as health information
organizations (HIOs) or prescription drug intermediaries (PDIs). HIOs
and PDIs are firms that analyze prescriber-identifying data to create
reports on prescriber behavior.15 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) mandates that this prescriber-identifying
data contain no patient identifiers such as names, addresses, and social
security numbers.16 Some integrated health care organizations such as
Kaiser Permanente restrict use of prescription data because they object
to influencing prescribing patterns to promote more costly, brand-name
drugs when cheaper generics are often equally effective.17 Only a small
fraction of pharmacies, however, restrict the use of prescriber data.18
HIOs combine the prescription information from pharmacies with
physicians’ demographic, practice, and contact information from the
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Masterfile to create reports on
physician prescribing patterns.19 HIOs lease these reports, subject to
nondisclosure agreements, to pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical
researchers, and government agencies.20 “Detailers, who represent drug

10.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).

11.

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.

12.

Id.

13.

Id. at 2662.

14.

21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2) (2006).

15.

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.

16.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).

17.

Robert Steinbrook, For Sale: Physicians’ Prescribing Data, 354 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2745, 2747 (2006).

18.

Id.

19.

Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of
Prescribing Data for Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248
(2011).

20.

Robert A. Musacchio & Robert J. Hunkler, More Than a Game of Keep
Away, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE (May 1, 2006), http://pharmexec.
findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=323311.
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manufacturers, then use these reports to refine their marketing tactics
and increase [pharmaceutical] sales.”21
Some physicians welcome detailers, claiming that detailers provide
them with studies relevant to their practices, useful free drug samples,
and targeted data about the prescribing patterns of other physicians.22
Generally, these physicians claim they are immune to detailers’ influence
and see no conflicts of interest.23 Other physicians, however, object that
detailing intrudes into their prescribing decisions.24 These physicians
insist that detailers should be restricted from using their prescribing
patterns for direct-to-physician marketing purposes.25
Studies show that detailing influences requests to add brand-name
medications to hospitals’ formularies, thus increasing prescribing costs
that add to the burgeoning cost of health care in the United States.26 In
2010, health-care expenditures in the United States surpassed
$2.5 trillion, more than three times the $724 billion spent in 1990 and
eight times the $255 billion spent in 1980.27 Prescription drugs account
for about ten percent of these increasing costs.28 Between 2002 and 2005,
the pharmaceutical industry spent $7 billion annually detailing brandname drugs to physicians.29 Aggressive marketing campaigns by large
drug companies and the billions spent in direct-to-consumer drug

21.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011).

22.

For those physicians who do not welcome detailers, the AMA offers
physicians the ability to withhold prescribing data from drug
representatives while still making it available for medical research. AMA
Program Offers Physicians a Choice When It Comes to Prescribing Data:
Q&A
with
Jeremy
Lazarus,
AMA,
http://www.amaassn.org/resources/doc/dbl-public/pdrp-qa-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 6,
2013) [hereinafter AMA Program].

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Fadi M. Alkhateeb & William R. Doucette, Electronic Detailing (Edetailing) of Pharmaceuticals to Physicians: A Review, 2 INT’L J.
PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTHCARE MARKETING 235, 236 (2008).

27.

OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TABLE
1: NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES; AGGREGATE AND PER CAPITA
AMOUNTS, ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION:
SELECTED
CALENDAR
YEARS
1960-2011
(2011),
available
at
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
downloads/tables.pdf.

28.

Id. at TABLE 4.

29.

Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 676 (2007).
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advertising lead to increased drug costs that are passed along to
patients.30
Detailing can also adversely affect health outcomes. Although the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires pharmaceutical companies
to engage in extensive drug testing to ensure that drugs are both safe and
effective,31 a drug’s long-term effects are sometimes unknown until the
drug has been on the market for several years.32 When detailers market to
“early adopters,” i.e., physicians who prescribe new drugs earlier than
other physicians,33 the number of patients taking a drug with potentially
unknown side effects increases.34
In response to these concerns, some states have enacted legislation
banning the use of prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes,35
and at least twenty-five other states have considered similar legislation.36
Implementation of these statutes has been unsuccessful, however, with
the most recent blow coming from a 6–3 Supreme Court decision, Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., ruling that a Vermont law banning the use of
prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes violated the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.37
Rather than banning the use of prescriber-identifying data, other
states have incorporated detailing programs of their own to balance the
information physicians receive from the pharmaceutical industry.38 This
practice is known as academic detailing, “a form of continuing medical
education in which a trained health professional such as a physician or
pharmacist visits physicians in their offices to provide evidence-based
information.”39
30.

See Prescription Project, supra note 3.

31.

21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (d) (2006).

32.

See Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug
Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BD. FAM. PRAC. 362, 366 (2001).

33.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).

34.

See id. at 85.

35.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1711-E-2-A (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated
by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).

36.

Brief for Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 771332.

37.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).

38.

Telephone Interview with Michael Fischer, Program Dir., Nat’l Res. Ctr.
for Acad. Detailing (Sept. 23, 2011).

39.

Michael Allen et al., Family Physicians’ Perceptions of Academic
Detailing: A Quantitative and Qualitative Study, 7 BMC MED. EDUC., Oct.
12, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/
content/pdf/1472-6920-7-36.pdf.
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In the wake of Sorrell, with patients’ health and wallets hanging in
the balance, what is the right solution to this problem? Should states
continue attempts to enact legislation carved around Sorrell that ban
the use of prescriber-identifying data? Should states go so far as to
regulate the practice of detailing itself? Or should states counterbalance
commercial detailing with academic-detailing programs?
This Article argues that state legislators should implement policies
supporting academic-detailing programs. Part I of this Article provides a
history and background of the pharmaceutical-detailing process. Part II
analyzes the First Circuit’s holding regarding prescription confidentiality
laws in Maine and New Hampshire. Part III examines the holdings in the
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court in Sorrell. Part IV analyzes
responses to pharmaceutical detailing. Part V examines the use of
academic detailing to respond to the negative effects of pharmaceutical
detailing and concludes that state legislators should implement policies
that support academic-detailing programs.

I. History and Background
Pharmaceutical drug detailing has evolved with the use of health
information technology over the last several decades. Data gathering,
physician resistance, and legislation have changed the landscape for
pharmaceutical companies that promote their drugs to physicians. This
section provides a history and background of how drug detailing started,
how physicians responded, and the status of drug detailing today.
A.

The History of Drug Detailing

The practice of selling prescriber-identifying data in direct-tophysician marketing has existed for decades. Detailers began gathering
data from doctors and pharmacists in the 1940s; some successful drug
reps maintained prescription data sources for years and sometimes even
decades.40 The federal government did not require prescriptions for drug
sales until the mid-1950s.41 Before then, the pharmaceutical industry’s
primary goal was to persuade pharmacies to stock their drugs, as
opposed to persuading doctors to prescribe them.42 In the 1950s,
pharmacist Raymond Gosselin formed a company that marketed a
database that could segment the prescription drug market by region and
supply information on the performance of specific drugs.43 In 1970, the
company was sold to IMS Health Inc., a recurring plaintiff in several
cases dealing with the sale of prescriber-identifying data today.44
40.

Musacchio & Hunkler, supra note 20.

41.

Greene, supra note 5, at 742.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 743.

44.

Id.
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As database technology has become more sophisticated and
affordable, HIOs have created systematic, nationwide directories similar
to the one created by Gosselin. These directories, available for license
since 1993, depict physicians’ prescribing habits categorized by product
and volume of prescriptions.45
In the seminal 1983 New England Journal of Medicine article that
defined academic detailing, Dr. Jerry Avorn and Stephen Soumerai
described a randomized, controlled trial of clinical pharmacists visiting
physicians’ offices to reduce the excessive use of specific drugs.46
The trial resulted in a 14 percent decrease in prescribing the drugs.47 The
authors concluded that “academically-based ‘detailing’ may represent a
useful and cost-effective way to improve the quality of drug-therapy
decisions and reduce unnecessary expenditures.”48
B.

Physician Resistance to Pharmaceutical Detailing and the
American Medical Association’s Response

Within the last decade, physicians have responded to the effects
commercializing prescriber-identifying data has had on prescribing
decisions. In 2004, the AMA conducted a physician survey regarding the
use of prescriber-identifying data by pharmaceutical companies.49 The
survey showed that the majority of physicians felt that the ability to
withhold their prescribing data from pharmaceutical sales representatives
would alleviate their concerns of drug reps intruding upon the doctorpatient relationship.50 In response to these findings, the AMA created the
Prescription Data Restriction Program (PDRP). Launched in 2006, the
PDRP allows physicians to restrict drug reps’ access to prescriberidentifying data.51
In practice, the PDRP is simple for physicians to use: they visit a web
site to opt out of sharing their prescriber-identifying data with
pharmaceutical representatives.52 Pharmaceutical companies are then
45.

Musacchio & Hunkler, supra note 20.

46.

Jerry Avorn & Stephen B. Soumerai, Improving Drug-Therapy Decisions
Through Educational Outreach: A Randomized Controlled Trial of
Academically Based “Detailing”, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1457, 1457 (1983);
see Biography of Dr. Jerry Avorn, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR ACAD. DETAILING,
http://www.narcad.org/experience/avorn/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2013)
(explaining that Dr. Avorn invented the concept of academic detailing and
is recognized as a leading expert on the topic).

47.

Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 46, at 1457.

48.

Id.

49.

AMA Program, supra note 22.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.
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required to check the opt-out list a minimum of four times a year and
have ninety days to comply with any opt-out requests.53 The program also
ensures that physicians know how to report inappropriate pharmaceuticalemployee behavior, that HIOs help physicians understand how prescribing
data is used, and that reports are created for physicians from the data to
enhance their clinical practices.54
The AMA does not collect, sell, or have access to prescribing data,
but HIOs do match information from the AMA’s Physician Masterfile to
prescribing data from other sources, such as pharmacies.55 The Masterfile
contains all physicians’ current and historical data.56 HIOs create reports
by combining prescribing and Masterfile data and license these reports
to pharmaceutical companies.57
Nevertheless, the PDRP has had little impact on restricting prescriber-identifying data. As of June 2011, only 28,000 of roughly 650,000
practicing physicians in the country have opted out through the PDRP.58
The AMA claims that it has distributed information about the PDRP to
over 500,000 physicians in the last three years.59 Other sources claim,
however, that only 25 percent of physicians are aware that the PDRP
even exists.60
The PDRP helps address many concerns, but it does not protect all
prescribers and does not restrict all pharmaceutical employees from
accessing prescribers’ identifying data. Only medical doctors can opt out
through the PDRP, while other prescribers (for example, osteopathic
physicians or nurse practitioners) are ineligible to opt out.61 While
physicians account for the largest portion of prescribers, this gap allows
drug reps to target other prescribers potentially against their wishes.
This loophole may create a problem for states where advanced practice

53.

See id.

54.

Id.

55.

AMA
Physician
Masterfile,
AMA,
http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/about-ama/physician-data-resources/physician-masterfile.page
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013).

56.

Id.

57.

AMA Program, supra note 22.

58.

Physicians Discuss Use of Prescribing Data, AMA, http://www.amaassn.org/resources/doc/dbl-public/pdrp_two_sides.pdf (last visited Jan. 8,
2013); David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of
Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 78 (2010).

59.

AMA Program, supra note 22.

60.

Greene, supra note 5, at 746.

61.

IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 23 n.17 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
judgment vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011).
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nurses or other medical professionals have independent authority to
prescribe medications to patients.62
Furthermore, the PDRP restricts only drug reps and their direct
supervisors from accessing prescriber-identifying data.63 Other officials at
pharmaceutical companies are still allowed access to the information.64
Other than the pharmaceutical industry’s own code of ethics,65 nothing
prevents an executive in a pharmaceutical company from “reminding” a
sales representative about a particular physician’s prescribing history
regardless of whether the physician has opted out.66 To address this
issue, the AMA created mechanisms to allow physicians to report
inappropriate conduct by pharmaceutical representatives or companies.67
Allowing physicians to monitor pharmaceutical companies acts as safety
net for when the companies fail to police themselves.68
Finally, the primary concerns at issue are safety and cost of
prescription drugs for patients. Should physicians be the only ones making
the decisions regarding sales reps’ roles in the physician-patient
relationship? This has led some states to enact legislation banning the use
of prescriber-identifying information with varying degrees of physician
privacy options, which will be discussed in further detail in Section III.69
C.

Pharmaceutical Detailing Today

While establishing the PDRP was a seemingly reasonable
compromise between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry, some
claim that the program does not restrict enough, while others argue that
the program is too limiting. Those claiming that the PDRP is not
restrictive enough argue that a drug rep’s job is to increase sales—not to
offer unbiased, evidence-based information to physicians. Hence, allowing
the pharmaceutical industry to influence the prescribing patterns of
physicians by offering them potentially biased information runs counter
62.

See, e.g., Lauren E. Gattanglia, Supervision and Collaboration
Requirement: The Vulnerability of Nurse Practitioners and Its Implications
for Retail Health, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1127, 1137 n.55 (2010) (observing
that in 2008 about twenty percent of states allowed nurse practitioners
independent prescriptive authority).

63.

AMA Program, supra note 22.

64.

Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 2745.

65.

PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM.,
WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 13 (2009).

66.

Allison Torres Burtka, Drug Reps and the Art of Manipulation, 46 TRIAL
28, 34 (2010).

CODE

ON INTERACTIONS

67.

AMA Program, supra note 22.

68.

Id.

69.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
318:47-f (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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to the AMA’s mission of promoting the science of medicine and the
betterment of public health.70 Conversely, others argue that restricting
pharmaceutical companies from accessing the data would likely increase
sales calls, decrease targeted educational information, and decrease drug
samples for physicians.71 Furthermore, if pharmaceutical manufacturers
are overly restricted from purchasing prescriber-identifying data, then
HIOs may no longer have a financial incentive to maintain valuable data
on physicians’ prescribing habits.72
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are not the only entities that
purchase prescriber-identifying data from HIOs. Several other parties
purchase HIO-collected data for medical research, law enforcement,
public health studies, drug recalls, studies on drug interactions, and even
bioterrorism response.73 For example, the FDA, the Center for Disease
Control, and the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency all use prescriberidentifying data to monitor use of controlled substances and to identify
prescribers who need time-sensitive safety information.74 Insurance
companies and pharmacy benefit managers also use prescriber-identifying
data to process claims and manage formulary compliance.75 These other
parties, however, spend far less on this data than the pharmaceutical
industry.76 If too many physicians opt out through the PDRP or if
legislation bans the use of prescriber-identifying data, then HIOs may
stop maintaining their billion-dollar databases or divert those resources
to areas that do not benefit the healthcare industry.77
Increased drug costs, patient safety issues, and complaints about the
PDRP eventually led three states—Maine, Vermont, and New
Hampshire—to enact legislation banning the use of prescriber-identifying
data for marketing purposes.78 However, suppressing the free flow of
information to pharmaceutical companies was not an effective solution to
these states’ concerns.
70.

See Laurie Barclay, AMA Discloses Masterfile Physician Data to
Pharmaceutical Companies, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (July 12, 2007),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/559704.

71.

AMA Program, supra note 22.

72.

Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 2747.

73.

Greene, supra note 5, at 747.

74.

Brief of Respondents IMS Health Inc. et al. at 37-38, Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779).

75.

Id. at 2-3.

76.

Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 2747.

77.

Brief for American Business Media et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 11, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No.
10-779).

78.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
318:47-f (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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II. IMS Health Inc. Litigation in the First Circuit
Before the Supreme Court of the United States decided Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., several states were concerned with the impact of
prescriber-identifying data on drug detailing, the patient-physician
relationship, and higher drug costs borne by patients. These concerns led
New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont to enact statutes banning the use
of prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes.79 This section
provides a synopsis of the legal battles that Maine and New Hampshire
faced in district court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
after enacting these statutes.
A.

Some Clarification on Parties to the IMS Health Inc. Cases

Confusion exists over exactly who the parties are to these lawsuits.
The defendant in each case is the attorney general of the state
implementing its prescription confidentiality law.80 The plaintiffs are not
only pharmaceutical companies but also several organizations variously
identified as “data miners,” “health information publishers,” and
“prescription drug information intermediaries.” Judge John Woodcock,
writing the majority opinion in IMS Health Inc. v. Rowe for the United
States District Court for the District of Maine, explained the reasoning
behind the many names assigned to the plaintiffs in these cases:
The Plaintiffs refer to themselves as “health information publishers,” a name that evokes an image consistent with their
First Amendment argument; the Attorney General refers to
them as “data miners,” a term that evokes an image consistent
with his regulatory contentions. The Court appreciates the
cleverness and power of characterization, but avoids valueladen terms . . . . [T]o describe the Plaintiffs, the Court uses
the term the law uses, ‘prescription drug information intermediary.’81
These “value-laden terms” mislead readers because all the above-listed
names refer to a single type of organization—firms that analyze
prescriber-identifying data to create reports on prescriber behavior.
Judge Woodcock referred to them as “prescription drug information
intermediaries” because that is the legal term used in Maine.82 This
79.

See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 318:47-f (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009),
invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).

80.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d and
vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); IMS
Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Me. 2007), rev’d by IMS
Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010).

81.

Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 158 n.3.

82.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-1-I (2008).
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Article refers to this group of plaintiffs as health information organizations.
B.

New Hampshire’s Prescription Confidentiality Law

In 2006, New Hampshire enacted its prescription confidentiality law to
contain prescription drug costs and protect both prescriber and patient
privacy.83 The law banned the sale, license, transfer, or use of prescriberidentifying data for any commercial purpose, although it recognized
several enumerated exceptions like pharmacy reimbursement, medical
research, and insurance functions.84 Several HIOs, including IMS Health
Inc., filed suit against New Hampshire’s Attorney General, challenging the
constitutionality of the law under the First Amendment.85 The threshold
question was whether the law regulated speech or conduct, with conduct
being entitled to substantially less First Amendment protection.86 The
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that
the statute restricted speech because, although it did not hinder
transmission of prescription records directly, the statute prevented
pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifiable data both to
identify a specific audience for their marketing efforts and to refine their
marketing messages.87
After finding that the statute regulated speech instead of conduct,
the court determined that the speech in question was “commercial
speech” and applied the US Supreme Court’s test from Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.88
Under Central Hudson, so long as the speech is a non-misleading, lawful
activity, government regulation is constitutionally permissible only if the
statute (1) serves a substantial governmental interest, (2) directly
advances that interest, and (3) restricts speech only as necessary to
further that interest.89 The district court found that New Hampshire’s
interests in containing health care costs and protecting physician
confidentiality were insufficient to justify restriction under Central
Hudson.90 First, New Hampshire failed to provide enough evidence to

83.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318 (2006).

84.

Id. at § 318:47-f.

85.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d and
vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).

86.

Id. at 174.

87.

Id. at 183.

88.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).

89.

Id.

90.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 183 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d
and vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
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prove it had a substantial interest in protecting prescriber privacy.91
Second, although the court agreed that reducing health care costs was a
substantial state interest, the statute did not directly advance that
interest, as there were several ways in which the state could address the
law’s underlying concerns without restricting protected speech.92 The
court also found that the statute was overly restrictive because many
other regulatory options—such as gift bans, continuing medical
education, and Medicaid revisions—existed to restrict detailing without
restricting speech.93 The court rendered New Hampshire’s prescription
confidentiality law unconstitutional and issued an injunction preventing
the law’s enforcement.94 New Hampshire’s Attorney General appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
C.

Maine’s Prescription Confidentiality Law

Following in the footsteps of New Hampshire, Maine enacted its prescription confidentiality law the next year.95 Like New Hampshire, Maine
passed its statute to contain prescription drug costs and protect prescriber and patient privacy.96 However, Maine also added “improv[ing]
public health” to its list of policy concerns.97
Unlike New Hampshire, Maine allows the use of prescriber-identifying
data in detailing drugs to physicians unless a physician affirmatively opts
out of sharing her data.98 Thus, Maine’s law is narrower than New
Hampshire’s by banning the sale, license, transfer, exchange for value, or
marketing use of prescriber-identifying data of only those physicians who
petition the state for confidentiality protection.99
Several HIOs, including IMS Health Inc., filed suit against Maine’s
Attorney General, claiming that Maine’s prescription privacy law was
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Dormant Commerce Clause.100 With guidance from the New Hampshire
district court’s decision earlier that year, the District Court for the
91.

Id. at 179.

92.

Id. at 182-83.

93.

Id. at 182.

94.

Id. at 183.

95.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008).

96.

Id.

97.

§ 1711-E-1-B.

98.

Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006) (allowing physician to
“opt in” to the prescription confidentiality program), with ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008) (allowing physicians to “opt out” of the
prescription confidentiality program).

99.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008).

100. IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 153 (D. Me. 2007), rev’d
by IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F. 3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010).
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District of Maine concluded that the state’s prescription confidentiality
law restricted commercial speech and was subject to intermediate
scrutiny under Central Hudson.101 Maine tried to distinguish its law from
New Hampshire’s by arguing that it restricted less speech due to the
opt-out provision,102 but the court ultimately held Maine’s statute
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.103
The district court prohibited enforcement of the law but lifted the
injunction as to certain non-enforcement provisions, such as allowing
prescribers to register with the state’s opt-out program to gather data
until the appellate process finalized the court’s decision.104 The plaintiffs
appealed to the First Circuit.
D.

The First Circuit’s Decision in the IMS Health Cases

In two different decisions, IMS Health v. Ayotte in 2008 and IMS
Health v. Mills in 2010, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that
both Maine’s and New Hampshire’s prescription confidentiality laws did
not violate the First Amendment.105 In reversing the lower courts’
decisions, the First Circuit found that both statutes regulated conduct
rather than speech.106 The court characterized prescriber-identifying
information as a “commodity” with no greater right to protection under
the First Amendment than “beef jerky.”107 Regulation of conduct under
the First Amendment requires only that the law be rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose.108 In both cases, the First Circuit held
that the statute satisfied this low burden.109
The First Circuit reasoned that even if the statutes regulated speech,
as opposed to mere conduct, they both still withstood intermediate
scrutiny.110 Applying the factors from Central Hudson, the First Circuit
held that the statute directly advanced at least one substantial
government interest and that there were no other less-restrictive means of
accomplishing those interests.111
101. Id. at 169.
102. Id. at 168-69.
103. Id. at 183.
104. Id.
105. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); IMS Health Inc. v.
Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated by
IMS Health Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011).
106. Mills, 616 F.3d at 19.
107. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 53.
108. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).
109. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47; Mills, 616 F.3d at 13.
110. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47; Mills, 616 F.3d at 13.
111. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47; Mills, 616 F.3d at 19.
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The only distinguishing factor the First Circuit found between the
Maine and New Hampshire laws concerned physician privacy options.
While Maine allowed physicians to opt out of sharing their prescriberidentifying information, New Hampshire imposed a total ban on the data
with some enumerated exceptions.112 The court found that Maine’s law
differed from New Hampshire’s “only in ways that weaken[ed] the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges,”113 and the distinction did not
change the First Circuit’s holding.114
After the First Circuit’s decisions, it appeared as if states were finally
able to the efforts of pharmaceutical detailers. However, the holding of one
appellate court was far from the final say in the matter. As discussed
below, the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court were not as lenient in
their interpretation of a similar prescription confidentiality law in
Vermont.

III. Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law
and the Supreme Court’s Decision in
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
With favorable decisions from the First Circuit, Vermont was likely
confident in successfully enacting its own prescription confidentiality
law. However, unlike those in Maine and New Hampshire, Vermont’s law
reached Supreme Court. This section analyzes the decisions of the
United States District Court for the District of Vermont, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.
A.

How Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law Differs from
Maine and New Hampshire’s Laws

Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law, also known as Act 80,
had several components aimed at hindering pharmaceutical detailing.
The law’s most controversial provision was Section 4631(d):
A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic
transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity
shall not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records con112. Mills, 616 F.3d at 19.
113. See id. (noting that “[u]nlike New Hampshire’s law, the Maine law only
prohibits plaintiffs from licensing, using, selling, transferring or exchanging
data identifying prescribers licensed in Maine who have opted-in for
confidentiality protection;” and “[u]nlike New Hampshire’s legislature, the
Maine legislature included specific findings that limiting detailers’ use of
Maine prescribers’ identifying data would reduce health care costs, ensure
Maine prescribers’ decisions were based on unbiased medical and scientific
evidence, and protect Maine prescribers from unwanted detailing visits.”).
114. Id.
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taining prescriber-identifiable information, nor permit the use of
regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information for
marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber
consents . . . . Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical
marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable information for
marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber
consents . . . .115
Section 4631(d) comprises three prohibitions: (1) pharmacies, health
insurers, and similar entities may not sell prescriber-identifying
information; (2) those entities may not use prescriber-identifying
information for marketing; and (3) pharmaceutical manufacturers and
pharmaceutical marketers may not use prescriber-identifying information
for marketing purposes.116 The prohibitions do not apply, however, if an
individual prescriber “opts in” to sharing his information with HIOs and
pharmaceutical representatives.117
The prescriber’s privacy options in Vermont fall somewhere between
Maine’s opt-out provision and New Hampshire’s blanket ban.118 While a
seemingly important issue, physician privacy options have proven to be
of little importance in court decisions. The lower courts extensively
discussed the differences in how each of these privacy options burdened
speech, but the issue never changed their decisions.
Each state’s prescription confidentiality law also asserted different
state interests. Maine and New Hampshire listed patient privacy as a state
interest but Vermont did not. The only court to reach the patient-privacy
issue was the District Court of Maine, which found that the interest did
not survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.119 Courts likely
do not find that patient privacy is an issue in prescription confidentiality
laws because healthcare providers must de-identify patients’ medical
records (i.e., they must remove personal information like names, addresses,
and social security numbers) pursuant to HIPAA.120 Many privacy
advocates argue that although the prescriptions have been de-identified,
115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
116. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011).
117. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
118. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (allowing physicians to opt in to
sharing prescriber information), and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f
(2006) (placing a ban on prescriber information with several listed
exceptions), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E (allowing
physicians to opt out of sharing prescriber information).
119. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
judgment vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011).
120. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)-(b) (2011).
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they can be re-identified using outside sources of data.121 For example, in
2006, America Online accidentally released users’ search query
information, which others were able to combine with publicly available
data to identify people’s medical conditions.122 However, while providing
prescriber-identifying data to pharmaceutical companies runs the risk of
re-identification, state and federal medical privacy laws already address
this issue.123
B.

Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law in the Lower Courts

In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed its prescription confidentiality law banning the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that
reveal the prescribing practices of individual physicians.124 Violators
faced a $10,000 penalty for each infraction, ensuring that pharmaceutical
companies would not treat the statute as merely “the cost of doing
business.”125 In 2009, Vermont HIOs, including IMS Health Inc., and
several pharmaceutical manufacturing associations, filed suit to challenge
the constitutionality of the law.126
Following a bench trial, the District Court for the District of
Vermont denied the plaintiffs’ motions for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief.127 The court found that Vermont’s statute regulated
speech and was thus subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson.128 Additionally, the court found that Vermont’s costcontainment and public health interests were substantial, but not its
interest in prescriber privacy.129 The court further found that the statute
directly advanced both of those interests and that no less-restrictive
means were available to further them.130 The plaintiffs appealed to the

121. Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. as Amici
Curiae supporting Petitioners at 24, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653 (2011) (No. 10-779).
122. Carol Eisenberg, Drugmakers Mine Data for Trial Patients, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 2,
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/drugmakers-mine-data-for-trial-patients-11032011.html.
123. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2011); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.514(a)-(b)
(2011) (explaining the rules pertaining to de-identification of protected
health information).
124. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
125. Id.
126. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2661 (2011).
127. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 464 (D. Vt. 2009).
128. Id. at 449.
129. Id. at 449-50.
130. Id. at 454-55.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the district
court’s decision and remanded the case.131
The Second Circuit found that Section 4631(d) of Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law qualified as a restriction on commercial
speech and was subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson.132 The court first found Vermont’s physician privacy interest
too speculative to qualify as a substantial state interest.133 The court
then found that, while Vermont’s interests in public health and reducing
health care costs were substantial, the statute did not advance those
interests in a direct and material way.134 Finally, the court found that
the law was not narrowly tailored to serve Vermont’s cost-containment
and public health interests.135 Vermont’s Attorney General appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States. Recognizing the split between
the First and Second Circuits, the Court granted certiorari on January
7, 2011.136
C.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
decision in a 6-3 decision that ruled Vermont’s law unconstitutional as a
violation of the First Amendment right to free speech.137 The majority,
led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that Vermont’s law imposed a
specific, content- and speaker-based burden on protected expression,
thereby warranting “heightened” judicial scrutiny to determine whether
the statute violated First Amendment free-speech protections.138 The
Court further held that Vermont’s asserted interests in physician
confidentiality, protecting physicians from bothersome pharmaceutical
sales representatives, and protecting the doctor-patient relationship did
not justify restricting protected free speech.139 Finally, the Court held
that the statute did not permissibly advance Vermont’s policy goals of
lowering medical costs and promoting public health.140

131. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 282 (2d Cir. 2010).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 276.
134. Id. at 279.
135. Id. at 282.
136. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 630 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131
S. Ct. 857 (Jan. 7, 2011) (No. 10-779).
137. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
138. Id. at 2667.
139. Id. at 2669-70.
140. Id. at 2670.
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D.

“Heightened” Judicial Scrutiny and the First Amendment

The threshold issue in Sorrell was which level of scrutiny applied to
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law. While Vermont argued that
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate under Central Hudson, the
plaintiffs argued not only that Vermont’s law failed under Central
Hudson, but also that the Court should apply a different test affording
commercial speech greater First Amendment protection.141
Ultimately, the Court applied what it termed “heightened scrutiny”
after determining that Vermont’s law unconstitutionally placed contentand speaker-based restrictions on free speech.142 The strictness of
“heightened scrutiny” is unclear, but based on the structure of the
majority’s analysis, dissenting Justice Breyer characterized it as “an
unforgiving brand of intermediate scrutiny.”143 Vermont argued that
heightened scrutiny was unwarranted because the law was attempting to
regulate only commercial activity.144 The Court agreed that the First
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or
conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.145 The Court noted,
however, that Vermont’s statute allowed prescription information to be
studied and used by all but pharmaceutical companies, thereby imposing
content- and speaker-based restrictions on speech.146
Obviating the need to decide which level of scrutiny applied to
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law, the Court held that the
statute failed under either heightened or intermediate scrutiny.147 The
dissent, led by Justice Breyer, argued that Central Hudson should have
applied and that Vermont’s law was a reasonable effort to regulate
commercial activity that imposed no significant burden on free speech.148
Breyer opined that the majority was returning to a time in which the
Court stepped into the shoes of state legislators.149
E.

Protecting Physician Privacy under Heightened Scrutiny

While the Court noted that Vermont’s physicians had an interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of their prescription decisions,150 it found
141. See id. at 2667-68.
142. Id. at 2664.
143. Id. at 2679.
144. Id. at 2664.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2667.
147. See id. at 2668.
148. Id. at 2673.
149. Id. at 2679.
150. Id. at 2668.
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that Vermont’s law was not drawn to serve that interest because
pharmacies could share prescriber-identifying data “with anyone for any
reason” except marketing.151 Vermont argued that the statute’s opt-in
provision allows the statute to withstand scrutiny. The Court, however,
found that this created only a “contrived choice” under which Vermont
offered doctors two options: (1) allow everyone to use their prescribing
data, or (2) forbid the use of their prescribing data by those Vermont
did not support without an option to curtail use by Vermont’s favored
speakers.152 The Court hinted that a broader choice of options in
restricting the use of the data might help—but would “not necessarily
save”—the statute from failing under the First Amendment.153
The Court never reached the argument of whether the statute
directly advanced Vermont’s interest in physician privacy.154 Rather, the
Court ended its inquiry immediately, finding that the statute did not
advance Vermont’s interest in physician privacy at all because the
statute granted such extensive use of prescriber-identifying information
to other parties, such as medical researchers and government entities.155
The Court ended Vermont’s physician-privacy argument by finding
not only that the statute did not advance the state’s interest in physician
privacy, but that the interest could be achieved by “remedies other than
content-based rules.”156 The Court noted that “physicians can, and often
do, simply decline to meet with detailers, including detailers who use
prescriber-identifying information.”157 Interestingly, the Court failed to
mention the PDRP, a private-sector solution not subject to the First
Amendment.
F.

Containing Prescription Drug Costs under Heightened Scrutiny

The majority acknowledged that Vermont’s second policy concern,
containing prescription drug costs, was a proper government interest.158
But the Court found yet again that Vermont’s statute did not advance
that interest in a constitutionally permissible way.159 The Court found
that the statute did not directly regulate the price of prescription drugs,
but only sought to lower drug costs by indirectly curbing detailers’ ability

151. Id.
152. Mello & Messing, supra note 19, at 1250.
153. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2670.
159. Id.
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to influence prescribing decisions.160 The Court noted that “the ‘fear that
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot
justify content-based burdens on speech.”161 Sufficiently convinced that
Vermont’s interest in cost containment of prescription drugs failed under
the First Amendment, the Court did not offer any examples of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest. In short, the Court suggested
that drug reps are simply too good at their jobs and that Vermont could
not restrict speech merely because physicians are persuaded by detailers’
messages.
G.

Promoting Public Health under Heightened Scrutiny

The Court paid little attention to Vermont’s final asserted interest
of promoting public health, noting that “[e]ven the United States, which
appeared here in support of Vermont, took care to dispute the State’s
unwarranted view that the dangers of new drugs outweigh their benefits
to patients.”162 Lumping this policy interest with containing drug costs,
the Court noted that promoting public health was a proper government
interest. Yet again, the Court found that the statute did not advance
that interest in a constitutionally permissible way by indirectly curbing
drug reps’ ability to influence prescription decisions.163
The Court failed to mention Vermont’s evidence showing that
pharmaceutical drug detailing boosted the prescribing of newly approved,
brand-name drugs, including Vioxx and Baycol.164 This may be because
Vermont and other states argued that generic alternatives were safer, not
that certain brand-name drugs may be dangerous. Even though the
Supreme Court did not address this issue in its opinion, Ayotte pointed
out that no evidence was offered to prove that generic alternatives are
safer than even the most dangerous brand-name drugs.165
H.

The Majority Provides Some Guidance

Sorrell struck a major blow to the movement against the use of
prescriber-identifying data in pharmaceutical detailing. However, the
Court did provide some guidance for lawmakers to craft statutes that
may survive the heightened scrutiny applied by the Court in Sorrell.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 2670-71 (quoting Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 374 (2002)).
162. Id. at 2671 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 24 n.4, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653 (2011) (No. 10-779)).
163. Id. at 2670.
164. Mello & Messing, supra note 19, at 1251.
165. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 180 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d
and vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
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First, the majority suggested that Vermont could have constructed
“a more coherent policy,” similar to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.166 The
Court was likely implying that more than one party (detailers) should be
excluded from using prescriber-identifying information. Second, the
Court suggested that if Vermont changed its prescription confidentiality
law from an opt-in to an opt-out structure like Maine’s law, then the
proposed law “might burden less speech” but “would not necessarily
save” the statute.167 Third, the Court advised that physicians should
simply close their doors to drug reps—a private-sector solution to the
problem not subject to the First Amendment.168
The Court never stated that following the first two suggestions
would automatically harmonize a statute with the First Amendment.
Any state that implements a prescription confidentiality law based on
those suggestions would still be taking a risk when other, lessobjectionable approaches might be equally effective. While not involving
any government action, the third above-listed suggestion is equally
ineffective. The next section will explain why these suggestions will not
work.

IV. Government Responses to Pharmaceutical
Detailing
Critics of increased oversight view the government’s actions as paternalistic and argued that physicians should be responsible enough to close
their doors to drug reps and find time to seek out additional information
on prescription drugs.169 On the other hand, proponents of increasing
regulation believe that the government should more actively oversee the
health of its citizens and assist busy physicians who receive potentially
biased information from drug reps.170 However, no perfect solution exists.
This section explores possible solutions to the problems raised by detailing
and how they would likely fail in light of Sorrell.
A.

Enacting Legislation Banning the Use of Prescriber-Identifying
Data Will Likely Fail Under the First Amendment

Although Maine’s prescription confidentiality law may still be
constitutional, it needs to be reconsidered in light of Sorrell. Because of
the Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the First Amendment in
regards to these statutes, states should refrain from enacting prescription
166. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n,
Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999)).
167. Id. at 2669.
168. Id. at 2669-70.
169. See Prescribing Data, supra note 58.
170. AMA Program, supra note 22.
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confidentiality laws of their own even if they learn from other states’
mistakes or take the Supreme Court’s advice.
While the Supreme Court did leave state legislators some leeway to
create statutes banning the use of prescriber-identifying data for
marketing purposes, it left them that room at the bottom of the steep
hill called “heighted judicial scrutiny.” Not only did the Supreme Court
find that heightened judicial scrutiny applies to prescription confidentiality laws, it noted that Vermont’s statute would still fail under
intermediate scrutiny.171 Thus, state legislators may find crafting a
similar prescription confidentiality law that would pass constitutional
muster very difficult.
The majority in Sorrell suggested that other states might be more
successful than Vermont by permitting the sale or disclosure of
prescriber-identifying data in only a few narrow and well-justified
circumstances, similar to the Privacy Rule set out in HIPAA.172 The
HIPAA Privacy Rule provides federal regulations for protecting certain
health information held by healthcare providers, health plans, and
healthcare clearinghouses, while giving patients rights with respect to that
information.173 The Privacy Rule also permits the disclosure of protected
health information needed for patient care and in narrow instances
important to public health.174 The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not focus on
any single group when restricting access to protected health information.
The Sorrell Court found that, unlike the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law made prescriber-identifying
information available to “an almost limitless audience” while barring
only pharmaceutical manufacturers and HIOs from accessing that
information.175 The majority explained that the structure of the statute
allowed the information to be studied and used by all but a narrow class
of disfavored speakers—the pharmaceutical industry—and did not justify
the burden the statute places on protected free speech.176
The dissent observed that the majority’s proposed solution of
likening Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law to HIPAA would
ironically deny access to prescriber-identifying data to more people, thus
imposing a greater burden upon the dissemination of information.177 As
noted above, a number of parties have access to prescriber-identifying
information: pharmaceutical companies; medical researchers; and
171. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667-68 (2011).
172. Id. at 2668.
173. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §
1320d–2 (1996); 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164 (2012).
174. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164 (2012).
175. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2684 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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government programs monitoring bioterrorism threats, drug recalls, and
public health.178 Some parties use prescriber-identifying information to
help reduce prescription drug costs. For example, government healthcare
programs, such as Medicare, use prescriber-identifying information to
convince physicians to prescribe generic drugs.179 Similarly, insurance
companies contact physicians with high rates of prescribing brand-name
drugs to persuade them to prescribe drugs that cost the insurance
company less money.180 A statute that excludes any of these additional
parties from accessing this data risks countering essential state interests
such as promoting public health or reducing prescription drug costs.
Therefore, although the Court seemingly afforded other states an
opportunity to pass similar legislation, following the majority’s advice
may prove counterintuitive.
Finally, statutes banning the use of prescriber-identifying data may
slow but will not stop pharmaceutical companies from detailing brandname drugs to physicians.181 No provisions in Maine, New Hampshire, or
Vermont’s statutes expressly prohibited detailers from communicating
truthful information to physicians; detailers must simply convey it
without the aid of prescriber-identifying information. Drug sales are far
too lucrative for pharmaceutical companies to stop promoting their
products to physicians. Even if prescription confidentiality laws were to
stop drug reps from detailing brand-name drugs to physicians, pharmaceutical companies would likely divert more money to direct-to-consumer
drug advertising, resulting in patients themselves becoming the new drug
reps.182
B.

Giving Physicians More Privacy Options Is Irrelevant to the Courts

The distinguishing provision between Vermont’s and Maine’s
prescription confidentiality laws was the prescribers’ ability to opt in or
opt out of sharing prescriber-identifying information with drug reps.
Opting in generally prohibits the sale, license, or transfer of the prescriberidentifying data for marketing purposes unless an individual physician
chooses to make the data available.183 Opting out, on the other hand,
prohibits the sale, license, or transfer of the data for marketing purposes
only if an individual physician chooses to restrict third parties from
178. Greene, supra note 5, at 747.
179. Brief for Respondent at 6, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011) (No. 10-779).
180. Id. at 8.
181. Allison Torres Burtka, Court Strikes Down Law Protecting Doctors’
Prescription Data, 43 TRIAL 84, 84 (2007).
182. See Donohue et al., supra note 29, at 676 (noting the increase in spending
on direct-to-consumer drug advertising).
183. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010) (allowing physicians to
opt in to sharing their prescriber data with pharmaceutical companies).
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accessing the data, similar to the AMA’s PDRP.184 An unconditional ban
prohibits the sale, license, or transfer of this data, leaving prescribers no
choice in the matter.185
As noted in the previous section, Vermont allowed physicians to opt
in to sharing their prescriber-identifying information, and the Supreme
Court found the statute unconstitutional.186 Maine’s law, on the other
hand, allowed physicians to opt out of sharing their prescriber-identifying
information, and its statute’s constitutionality is still undecided. New
Hampshire’s law, which placed an unconditional ban on the release of
prescriber-identifying information, is also unconstitutional, as it is even
more restrictive than Vermont’s law.
Most states will likely refrain from enacting prescriptionconfidentiality laws similar to those in Vermont or New Hampshire.
However, states that wish to enact statutes similar to Maine’s prescription
confidentiality law should also refrain from doing so because it could still
be invalidated. The majority in Sorrell noted that Vermont might have
restricted less speech by switching to Maine’s opt-out format, though that
“would not necessarily save” Vermont’s statute from failing under the
First Amendment.187
C.

Telling Physicians to Close Their Doors Will Not Solve Anything

The majority in Sorrell suggested that physicians could simply close
their doors to detailers.188 According to the Court, “[d]octors who wish to
forgo detailing altogether are free to give ‘No Solicitation’ or ‘No
Detailing’ instructions to their office managers or to receptionists at
their places of work.”189 In fact, several hospitals and physician offices
already deny drug reps entry.190 So why should it matter if drug reps
access physicians’ prescribing information?
While closing the door to drug reps may protect physicians’ privacy,
it will do nothing to lower drug costs for patients and leaves physicians
with less information on brand-name prescription drugs.191 Furthermore,
closing the door to drug reps would heavily reduce physicians’ access to

184. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); AMA Program,
supra note 22.
185. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006).
186. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
187. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
188. Id. at 2670.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Managing Visits from Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives,
INST. FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICES (May 22, 2008),
http://www.ismp.org/newsletters/acutecare/articles/20080522.asp.
191. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2683 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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free drug samples that physicians provide to patients at no cost.192 As
noted above, physicians have limited time to research new prescription
drugs without sacrificing time with patients. If physicians choose to
simply turn a deaf ear, then where will they find time to research
information on the drugs they are prescribing to patients?

V. Academic Detailing Is the Best Response
to Sorrell
According to the Supreme Court, providing physicians with more—
not less—information is the answer to states’ issues with the use of
prescriber-identifying data in drug detailing.193 As one Vermont physician
stated: “We have a saying in medicine, information is power. And the
more you know, or anyone knows, the better decisions can be made.”194
The Supreme Court agreed, announcing that “information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them.”195 To avoid the
legal pitfalls faced by Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, states should
take the Supreme Court’s advice by supporting academic-detailing
programs. This section explains how academic detailing can successfully
protect physician privacy, contain prescription drug costs, and promote
public health without legal interference.
A.

What Is Academic Detailing?

Academic detailing, otherwise known as “educational outreach,” is a
form of continuing medical education in which trained health professionals
such as physicians, registered nurses, advanced practice nurses, and
pharmacists visit prescribers to provide evidence-based information on
prescription drugs.196 Academic detailing combines the direct-to-physician
marketing approach of the pharmaceutical industry with academic,
evidence-based, noncommercial information.197 As an initial matter, it is
important to distinguish academic detailing from “counter detailing.”
Critics contend that academic and counter detailing are no different
because they both attempt to limit access to newer, breakthrough drugs

192. Tara Parker-Pope, Who Gets Free Drug Samples? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
2008, 10:26 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/who-gets-freedrug-samples/.
193. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Allen et al., supra note 39, at 2.
197. Id.
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in the interest of saving money.198 The goals of each program, however,
differ greatly. Counter detailing involves dissuading physicians from
prescribing a particular drug and perhaps prescribing a different drug in
its place.199 Pharmaceutical companies often engage in counter detailing
against each other.200 Some states, such as Vermont, have been accused
of engaging in counter detailing merely to persuade physicians to
prescribe generics over brand-name drugs solely in the name of cost
savings.201
On the other hand, academic detailing, as described by its inventor
Jerry Avorn, “is not about promoting the cheapest drugs or generic
drugs per se; it is about prescribing the most appropriate drugs based on
safety and efficacy data, and when all else is equal, prescribing costeffective therapeutic options. The primary focus is on the evidence.”202
Presenting evidence-based information improves patient health outcomes
and lowers prescription drug costs, thus aligning the interests of
patients, physicians, and payers.203
Pharmaceutical companies argue that academic detailers hold an
unfair competitive advantage in communicating with prescribers because
academic detailers do not hold themselves to the same ethical standards as
pharmaceutical detailers, who voluntarily refrain from providing gifts and
meals to physicians.204 While the government does not regulate academic
detailers in the same way as pharmaceutical detailers, comparing the two
is inapposite. Academic detailers have some form of higher education with
a clinical background, whereas many pharmaceutical detailers have no
clinical background beyond a few weeks of on-the-job training.205

198. THE HILLTOP INSTITUTE, ACADEMIC DETAILING: A REVIEW OF
LITERATURE AND STATES’ APPROACHES 1 (2009), available
http://www.hilltopinstitute.org/publications/AcademicDetailingReviewOfTheLiteratureAndStates'Approaches-December2009.pdf
[hereinafter HILLTOP INSTITUTE].

THE

at

199. Academic
Detailing
at
a
Glance,
MAINE MED. ASSOC.,
http://www.mainemed.com/academic/glance.php (last visited Jan. 6,
2013).
200. Prescription Project, supra note 3, at 1.
201. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011) (No. 10-779).
202. JENNIFER RECK, PRESCRIPTION POLICY CHOICES, A TEMPLATE FOR
ESTABLISHING AND ADMINISTERING PRESCRIBER SUPPORT AND EDUCATION
PROGRAMS
5
(2008),
available
at
http://www.policy
choices.org/documents/ADPITemplate91708.pdf.
203. Id.
204. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH, supra note 65, at 13.
205. Ann Woloson & Jennifer Reck, Cheerleaders vs. Clinicians: Where do You
Want Your Doctor Getting Information on Prescription Drugs?,
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Academic detailers are more analogous to “medical science liaisons”
(MSLs), therapeutic specialists within pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and
medical device companies who have advanced scientific training and
pharmaceutical degrees in the life sciences.206
The exact number of states utilizing academic detailing programs is
difficult to ascertain because states choose many different levels of
implementation, ranging from fully-funded government programs to
smaller, private programs with little to no government involvement.207
Thus far, eighteen states and Washington, D.C. have academic detailing
programs in some form.208
While the United States began implementing academic detailing just
recently, several other countries have utilized it successfully for years.209
Five Canadian provinces currently have academic detailing programs
employing a total of thirty detailers.210 The programs collaborate
through an umbrella program known as the Canadian Academic
Detailing Collaboration that is facilitated by monthly conference calls.211
Many other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and the
Netherlands, also have academic detailing programs currently in place.212
Since 1991, Australia has utilized academic detailing through the Drug
and Therapeutics Information Service and the National Prescribing
Service, which conduct more than 9,000 academic detailing visits
annually, demonstrating academic detailing’s ability to operate in large
countries.213

PRESCRIPTION
POLICY
CHOICES
(Feb.
6,
2008),
http://www.progressivestates.org/files/PressRelease-PrescriptionPolicy
Choices-AcademicDetailing2-6-08.pdf.
206. Samuel Dyer, What is a Medical Science Liaison?, MSL WORLD
(June 30, 2011), http://www.mslworld.com/news/29/What-is-a-MedicalScience-Liaison-.html.
207. Telephone Interview with Michael Fischer, Program Dir., Nat’l Res. Ctr.
for Acad. Detailing (Sept. 23, 2011).
208. These states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont.
Id.
209. RECK, supra note 202, at 7; HILLTOP INSTITUTE, supra note 198, at 11.
210. HILLTOP INSTITUTE, supra note 198, at 12; Rosemary Bacovsky et al.,
Canadian Academic Detailing Collaboration: Evaluating Processes and
Outcomes of Academic Detailing, 139 CAN. PHARMACIST J. 54 (2006).
211. RECK, supra note 202, at 7.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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B.

Federal Initiatives for Academic Detailing Programs

Although academic detailing has been around since 1983,214 the
federal government took an interest in the idea only recently. In 2009,
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) allocated $1.1
billion to the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct
comparative
effectiveness
research
analyzing
different
healthcare interventions.215 Of these funds, $300 million was directed to
lay the groundwork for a broader federal academic detailing program.216
One year later, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act further
solidified government-funded comparative effectiveness research by
creating
the Patient
Centered
Outcomes
and
Research
Institute (PCORI), an independent program intended to provide
patients with a better understanding of the best prevention, treatment,
and care options available as well as the scientific information supporting those options.217
In April 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), a government-run program under the Department of Health
and Human Services, solicited contractors to support an academicdetailing initiative to integrate the agency’s comparative-effectiveness
tools through on-site visits with clinicians, nurses, health plan
formularies, and professionals.218 AHRQ awarded a contract to create a
publicity center and regional dissemination centers and to evaluate the
impact of the other contracts.”219
C.

Legal Advantages of Academic Detailing

As shown in Sorrell, Vermont’s attempt to suppress the free flow of
prescriber-identifying data to pharmaceutical detailers was impermissible
under the First Amendment.220 Academic detailing, on the other hand,
can sufficiently achieve many of the same policy goals, such as containing prescription drug costs and promoting public health, with no legal
interference. Academic detailing does not stifle or necessarily even
214. See Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 46.
215. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
216. Mike Mitka, New Physician Education Initiatives Seek to Remove the Devil
from the Detailing, 306 JAMA 1187 (2011) (“The DHHS in turn is
spending $300 million through its Agency for Healthcare Quality and
Research (AHRQ), in part to conduct an Academic Detailing Initiative.”).
217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No. 111-148, 124 Stat
727, § 6301 (2010).
218. Academic Detailing, FEDBIZOPPS.GOV, https://www.fbo.gov/spg/HHS/
AHRQ/DCM/AHRQ-10-10011A/listing.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
219. Id.
220. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
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contradict the speech of pharmaceutical detailers; it simply provides
physicians with more information on prescription drugs.221 It offers
physicians greater prescribing autonomy by supplying scientific
information.222 As the Court noted in Sorrell, “private decision-making
can avoid governmental partiality and thus insulate privacy measures
from First Amendment challenge.”223 Because courts will not monitor an
academic detailing program under the high-power judicial microscope of
“heightened scrutiny,” any legal action brought against a program will
likely not face such judicial challenges.
D.

Protecting Physician Privacy with Academic Detailing and the
PDRP

Protecting physician privacy was the only policy goal that the prescription confidentiality laws in Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire all
had in common.224 The Court did not recognize physician privacy as a
substantial government interest and further noted that banning the use
of prescriber-identifying data would not solve the issue.225 Outside of
banning drug reps from physicians’ offices altogether, nothing will stop
drug reps from promoting their products to physicians. There is simply
too much money at stake.
The larger concern of courts, legislatures, and society is not to protect physicians; rather, it is to protect patients, whether that involves
their personal health information, health outcomes, or money spent on
health care.226 HIPAA and other state medical privacy laws already
protect patients’ privacy by restricting disclosure of patients’ protected

221. RECK, supra note 202, at 5.
222. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669 (June 23, 2011) (describing the “contrived
choice” Vermont gave to physicians to protect their prescriber-identifying
data: “[e]ither consent, which will allow the doctor’s prescriber-identifying
information to be disseminated and used without constraint; or, withhold
consent, which will allow the information to be used by those speakers
whose message the State supports.”).
223. Id.
224. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4631(d) (2010) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1711-E-1-B.
225. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
226. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pts.
160, 164) (“This rule includes standards to protect the privacy of
individually identifiable health information. The rules below . . . present
standards with respect to the rights of individuals who are the subjects of
this information . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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health information.227 There are very few, if any, existing laws addressing
the privacy rights of physicians.
However, if physicians are concerned about protecting the privacy of
their prescribing habits, there is an existing solution that academic
detailers can remind physicians of during office visits—the AMA’s
Physician Data Restriction Program.228 Through the PDRP, physicians
may restrict pharmaceutical detailers from accessing the AMA’s
Masterfile to obtain their contact information, which prevents them from
assembling prescriber-identifying data reports.229 As discussed above, this
is a private-sector solution to a problem that Vermont, New Hampshire,
and Maine unsuccessfully tried to solve through government regulation.230 While academic detailing itself may not protect physicians’
privacy rights, academic detailers can at least provide physicians with
the right information to do so.
E.

Reducing Prescription Drug Costs with Academic Detailing

As shown in Sorrell, laws banning the use of prescriber-identifying
information do not directly advance the goal of containing prescriptiondrug costs.231 Academic detailing, however, has already proven to
contain prescription drug costs in several ways.232 Studies on the cost of
academic detailing indicate that potential savings exist through utilizing
cheaper or fewer high-cost prescription drugs.233 According to a Harvard
Medical School study, for every dollar spent on an academic detailing
program, a state saves at least two dollars in reduced drug costs.234 This
study directly compared physicians who were receptive to academic
detailer visits with those who were not in Medicaid programs in
Arkansas, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.235 The
study found that academic detailing significantly reduced prescriptions

227. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §
1320d–2; 45 C.F.R. pt. 164.
228. See AMA Program, supra note 22.
229. See id.
230. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662.
231. Id. at 2670.
232. PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESCRIBER
EDUCATION (“ACADEMIC DETAILING”) PROGRAMS 5-6 (2008), available at
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc_store/publications/costeffectiveness_of_prescriber_education_programs.pdf.
233. RECK, supra note 202, at 5.
234. Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Economic and Policy Analysis of
University-based Drug “Detailing”, 24 MED. CARE, 313, 313-31 (1986).
235. Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 46, at 1459.
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for three often overused drugs: Cephalexin, Propoxyphene, and Papaverine.236
In addition to decreasing utilization of over-prescribed drugs,
academic detailing can save states money by persuading physicians to
switch from prescribing expensive, brand-name drugs to generics when
equally effective and medically appropriate.237 According to one study,
increased use of generic drugs would result in a cost savings of $8.8
billion dollars per year nationwide.238 For example, evidence shows that
the first choice for treating patients with high blood pressure should be
an inexpensive thiazide diuretic rather than any one of several new,
more expensive, brand-name drugs that pharmaceutical detailers
promote to physicians.239
Academic detailing can also reduce costs outside of prescription
drugs by preventing disease. While the IMS Health litigation generally
focused on cost savings associated with prescription drugs, states can
also utilize academic detailing to expand cost savings into other medical
arenas, such as techniques and tools that address office-based barriers to
cancer screening.240 In one study assessing the effects of academic
detailing on increasing breast cancer screening in two medicallyunderserved communities, researchers found a statistically-significant
intervention effect on mammography and clinical breast examination by
female patients age forty and over.241 Physicians choosing to receive
educational information from academic detailers on breast cancer
screenings correctly identified significantly more risk factors for breast
cancer than physicians not participating in the study.242
Academic detailing can save states money in several ways that
prescription confidentiality laws cannot: by curbing overprescribing of
expensive drugs, increasing prescribing of generic drugs when medically
appropriate, and potentially reducing future medical expenses by
preventing disease.

236. Id. at 1461.
237. Jennifer S. Haas et al., Potential Savings from Substituting Generic Drugs
for Brand-Name Drugs: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, 1997-2000, 142
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 891, 896 (2005).
238. Id. at 894.
239. Academic Detailing in Practice: A Tale of Four States, AARP RX
WATCHDOG
REPORT,
Dec.
2009,
at
5,
available
at
http://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/cs/health/206907rxwatchdog_dec_
09.pdf.
240. Sherri Sheinfeld Gorin et al., Effectiveness of Academic Detailing on Breast
Cancer Screening Among Primary Care Physicians in an Underserved
Community, 19 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 110, 111 (2006).
241. Id. at 111, 116.
242. Id. at 117
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F.

Academic Detailing Programs’ Costs Weighed against Profits

The high cost of starting effective academic detailing programs raises
doubts about their cost-effectiveness. Annual funding for large academic
detailing programs can range from $1-2 million.243 A portion of this
budget derives from annual salaries paid to medical professionals. In
2008, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the average annual
wage for academic detailers ranged from $74,370 to $137,290.244
A 2001 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association
recommends that state policymakers use a formula to decide whether
implementing an academic detailing program is cost-effective.245 The
article explores the cost-effectiveness of academic detailing on the use of
ACE inhibitors and antidepressants.246 Although treating heart-failure
patients with ACE inhibitors instead of selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs) yielded better health outcomes and a cost savings of
$75 per patient,247 under the cost-benefit formula, implementing an
academic detailing program to promote ACE inhibitors over SSRIs
would not save enough money to justify the program’s start-up costs.248
These results are misleading. According to clarifications set out in
the study itself, the estimated costs for an academic detailing program to
deliver information on one drug assumes divisibility of each detailer’s
time and no scale effects.249 In other words, the cost-saving totals should
be seen as indicative rather than definitive when deciding whether to
implement an academic detailing program.250 For example, the formula
assumed that policymakers would implement an academic detailing
program to conduct educational outreach for one purpose—to utilize
ACE inhibitors over SSRIs. The example failed to account for states
utilizing academic detailing to change prescriber behavior for more than
one drug.251 A different study showed that Pennsylvania’s academic
detailing program reduced drug costs by $120 per doctor each month for
a single class of drugs.252 Over the course of a year, cost savings could

243. HILLTOP INSTITUTE, supra note 198, at 7, 9 (noting $1 million program cost
in Pennsylvania and $1.9 million in South Carolina).
244. Id. at 17.
245. James Mason et al., When is it Cost-Effective to Change the Behavior of
Health Professionals?, 286 JAMA 2988, 2989 (2001).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2990.
248. Id. at 2991.
249. Id at 2990.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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potentially reach $572,000, or more than half of the original $1 million
start-up cost.253 Pennsylvania’s program may not be cost-effective
according to the above formula, but if the state found one more equally
cost-effective drug to focus their detailing efforts on, the program’s net
savings would surpass start-up costs in the first year.
If state policymakers are concerned with academic detailing program
start-up costs, states might consider a number of financing sources,
including fees charged to manufacturers and labelers in the prescription
drug industry, settlements from prescription-drug lawsuits, lottery funds,
and federal grants.254 Maine, for example, obtains approximately
$300,000 from manufacturers’ fees, funds from drug settlements, and a
grant from AHRQ for the dissemination of comparative effectiveness
research.255
Private grants may also offset program costs. For example, the Idaho
Medicaid Pharmacy Unit obtained a $50,000 grant in 2009 from The
Prescription Project to support an academic detailing pilot program
targeting prescribers of mental-health medications.256 There are several
private organizations dedicated to providing nonbiased information on
prescription drugs, including The Independent Drug Information Service,
the Alosa Foundation, the Drug Effectiveness and Review Project, and the
Pew Prescription Project.257
Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to regulate the practice of detailing itself to establish initial funding for academic detailing programs.
For example, Washington, D.C. recently enacted legislation to regulate
the practice of pharmaceutical detailing.258 Detailers operating in
Washington, D.C. must obtain a detailing license or face a fine of up to
252. PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESCRIBER
EDUCATION (“ACADEMIC DETAILING”) PROGRAMS 2 (2008), available at
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc_store/publications/costeffectiveness_of_prescriber_education_programs.pdf.
253. Id.
254. HILLTOP INSTITUTE, supra note 198, at 5.
255. Id. at 11.
256. Academic Detailing, IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE,
http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Medical/PrescriptionDrugs/Aca
demicDetailing/tabid/208/Default.aspx (last updated Dec. 31, 2010).
257. See, e.g., THE INDEPENDENT DRUG INFORMATION SERVICE HOME PAGE,
http://www.rxfacts.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); THE ALOSA
FOUNDATION, http://02ce0e8.netsolhost.com/blog1/ (last visited Jan. 8,
2013); OREGON HEALTH & SCIENCE UNIVERSITY, DRUG EFFECTIVENESS
REVIEW PROJECT (DERP), http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/research/centersinstitutes/evidence-based-policy-center/derp/index.cfm/ (last visited Jan.
11, 2013); Pew Prescription Project, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
http://www.pewhealth.org/projects/pew-prescription-project-85899367092
(last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
258. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 17, § 8300 et seq. (2009).
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$10,000 or other sanctions.259 Additionally, they must obtain a biannual
license, sign an affidavit swearing to a code of ethics, graduate from an
institute of higher education, and pay application and licensure fees.260
License renewal requires a minimum of fifteen hours of continuing education every two years.261 Detailers must also maintain a record of their
communications with licensed health professionals or their representatives
for five years, including the name of the business; the date, time, and
location of the contact; the products discussed; whether samples were
provided; and the type of materials provided.262 Such regulations are not
only another option for generating revenue for an academic detailing
program but also more closely monitor the communications between
detailers and prescribers.
Georgia received federal assistance to establish an academic detailing
program through ARRA grant funding.263 In September 2010, AHRQ
awarded a three-year, $11.7 million contract to Total Therapeutic
Management, a physician- and patient-education company in Georgia, to
integrate the AHRQ’s comparative effectiveness tools through on-site
visits with clinicians, nurses, health plan formularies, and other
professionals.264 Georgia, however, is an outlier, as the federal government
has not initiated academic detailing programs in any other state.
States can also reduce program costs by learning from drug reps’ use
of information technology in promoting drugs to physicians. As noted
above, in 2005, the average primary care physician met with twentyeight drug reps each week for roughly two hours and fifteen minutes
total.265 Because of the dramatic increase in the ratio of detailers to
physicians, the cost of face-to-face detailing per physician rose more than
31 percent between 2000 and 2004.266 According to one study, this was
not due to a lack of drug reps employed by pharmaceutical companies,
but rather a growing trend of physicians participating in electronic
detailing (“e-detailing”), the promotion of pharmaceutical products using
259. Kevin B. O’Reily, New Plan Would Require D.C. Drug Detailers to
Become Licensed, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2008/02/11/prsb0211.htm.
260. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 17, § 8300 et seq. (2009).
261. Id.
262. Id.; HILLTOP INSTITUTE, supra note 198, at 8-9.
263. See Academic Detailing, FEDBIZOPPS.GOV, https://www.fbo.gov/
spg/HHS/AHRQ/DCM/AHRQ-10-10011A/listing.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2013).
264. Id.
265. Rayna Herman & Ashley Mahoney, 2005 Access Report: The Current
State of Pharma Sales, PHARMACEUTICAL REPRESENTATIVE, July 1, 2005,
at 16-17.
266. Id.
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an online channel and information technology as opposed to traditional,
face-to-face detailing.267 Aside from increasing development of the
internet, there are three reasons for the growth of e-detailing: (1) the
falling effectiveness and increasing costs of employing pharmaceutical
sales representatives to meet with physicians face-to-face, (2) increasingly busier physicians with less time to meet with sales representatives,
and (3) increased acceptance of the internet by physicians.268 Another
possible reason for the growth of e-detailing, and the corresponding
decrease in face-to-face detailing, may be the rapid increase in direct-toconsumer pharmaceutical marketing.269
Over time, e-detailing has progressed far beyond using the internet to
detail drugs to physicians via e-mail. Today, pharmaceutical companies
utilize e-detailing generally in one of two ways: virtual e-detailing, which is
a taped or interactive presentation (such as a website) conveying a
message to prescribers; or video e-detailing, which is face-to-face, personal
computer-based video conferencing between a prescriber and a drug rep.270
This latter type of e-detailing is more similar to traditional detailing and is
one way for detailers to reach prescribers practicing in remote geographic
areas or physicians who are not permitted to see representatives at their
offices.271
Studies on academic detailing show that face-to-face meetings with
prescribers are the best approach to yield the highest cost savings.272
However, face-to-face meetings may not always be feasible. For instance,
detailers may find traversing the vast rural areas of Texas too timeconsuming or may be stymied by snowstorms in Vermont. To overcome
these obstacles, academic detailing programs can use live or virtual
e-detailing when a face-to-face relationship with the prescriber has
already been established.273
Efforts by the pharmaceutical industry to replace traditional detailing
with e-detailing have been unsuccessful.274 Using e-detailing as a
supplement to in-person academic detailing, however, may prove cost-

267. Id.
268. Andree Bates et al., Navigating the e-Detailing Maze, 2 INT’L J. MED.
MARKETING 255, 255-56 (2002).
269. See Donohue et al., supra note 29, at 675 (showing that money spent on
direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising increased by $29.9 billion
from 1996 to 2005).
270. Alkhateeb & Doucette, supra note 26, at 237-38.
271. Id. at 239.
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273. Alkhateeb & Doucette, supra note 26, at 238-39.
274. Id. at 239-41.
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effective and will help further implement educational outreach in remote
geographic areas.275
In sum, as shown in several states and studies, academic detailing can
decrease prescription drug costs better than prescriber confidentiality laws.
With several potential funding sources to minimize start-up costs, states
can utilize academic detailing to save money by reducing the amount of
unnecessary, brand-name prescription drugs prescribed to patients and
utilizing e-detailing to supplement face-to-face interactions with
prescribers.
G.

Promoting Public Health with Academic Detailing

As the Court stated in Sorrell, prescription confidentiality laws
banning the use of prescriber-identifying information will not advance a
state’s interest in promoting public health.276 Academic detailing, however,
can help prescribers pinpoint drugs that may endanger patient safety and
can be substituted with alternative drugs with a proven safety history. As
noted above, pharmaceutical detailers use prescriber-identifying data to
locate early adopters of new prescription drugs, sometimes leading
physicians to prescribe drugs without an established safety record.277
Vioxx began as a success story in pharmaceutical marketing but
ended in tragedy. First marketed in 1999, physicians prescribed Vioxx to
more than 80 million patients.278 Over the course of five years, the FDA
estimated that Vioxx caused 88,000–139,000 heart attacks.279 Although
pharmaceutical companies work hard to promote new drugs quickly
because of a “ticking patent clock” and competition among other brandname drugs, stories such as Vioxx suggest that a wait-and-see approach
may better promote public health.280 Merck, the pharmaceutical
company that created Vioxx, eventually withdrew the drug from the
market in September 2004 due to safety issues.281 In November 2011,
Merck agreed to pay $950 million and pled guilty to a criminal misde-
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277. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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meanor charge to resolve its illegal promotion of Vioxx to physicians and
consumers.282
In February 2005, Dr. David Graham produced a study comparing
the risk of adverse cardiovascular events in patients taking Vioxx against
patients taking Celebrex.283 According to the study, more than 27,700
heart attacks and sudden cardiac deaths occurred between 1999 and
2003 that could have been avoided.284 Taking 25 milligrams per day or
more of Vioxx resulted in more than three times the risk of acute heart
attacks or sudden cardiac death compared with patients using
Celebrex.285 If academic detailers provided prescribers additional scientific, evidence-based information about Vioxx, some of these adverse
health outcomes may have been mitigated.
In addition to focusing efforts on a particular drug, existing academic
detailing programs also focus on particular ailments or diseases for which
physicians can make better-informed prescribing decisions to promote
public health.286 Focusing on a specific drug or disease allows academic
detailers to better tailor messages to prescribers.287 For instance, in
Pennsylvania’s academic detailing program, detailers focus their efforts on
diseases typically treated with proton pump inhibitors, antihypertensive
drugs, antiplatelet therapy, lipid-lowering drugs, and COX-2
inhibitors/non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.288 Detailers in
Washington, D.C. focus on diabetes and antiplatelet therapy,289 South
Carolina’s academic detailing program focuses on mental health within the
Medicaid program,290 and Maine focuses on diabetes and antiplatelet
282. Peter Loftus & Brent Kendall, Merck to Pay $950 Million in Vioxx
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204531404577054472253737682.html?mod=WSJ_hp_
LEFTWhatsNewsCollection.
283. Graham et al., supra note 278, at 475.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 478.
286. RECK, supra note 202, at 8.
287. Id.
288. Under the Influence: Can We Provide Doctors an Alternative to Biased
Drug Reviews?: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 110th
Cong. 37 (2008) (statement of Nora Dowd Eisenhower, Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t
of Aging).
289. The District of Columbia Academic Detailing Program Quality
Improvement and Evaluation, THE ALOSA F OUNDATION 3-4 (Aug. 2010),
http://doh.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doh/publication/
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therapy.291 Each of these programs found that focusing efforts on specific
problem areas, as opposed to providing prescribers with an abundance of
drug safety information all at once, improved the effectiveness of
education outreach visits.292
Academic detailing can promote public health more effectively than the
prescription confidentiality laws enacted by Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont. By providing non-biased, evidence-based information on
prescription drugs to prescribers, states will be able to increase prescriptions
for appropriate drugs, decrease prescriptions for inappropriate drugs, and
prevent disease and other adverse medical events.
H.

Prescriber-Identifying Data Can Improve Academic Detailing

Like pharmaceutical companies, academic detailing programs can use
prescriber-identifying data to locate “early adopters” and other physicians
who can benefit from evidence-based information on the drugs they are
prescribing. Before the Supreme Court ruled against it in Sorrell,
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law set aside funding for an
academic detailing program that used prescriber-identifiable data to
promote the use of generics in place of brand-name drugs.293 However,
states could use prescriber-identifying data to aid academic detailing
programs in several other ways. For example, states could use this
information to locate physicians who treat certain cardiologic ailments to
supply them with information on the benefits of medications designed to
improve heart health.294 Alternatively, if a state learns about the adverse
side effects of certain medications, the state’s academic detailing program
could then use prescriber-identifying data to locate prescribers most in
need of safety information on those problematic medications.295 States
may view prescriber-identifying data solely as a means for pharmaceutical
manufacturers to better detail brand-name drugs to prescribers. However,
states should also be aware of the several ways that this information can
aid academic detailers in promoting public health and decreasing prescription drug costs.
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Conclusion
Pharmaceutical detailing can increase prescription drug costs and
worsen patients’ health outcomes. Pharmaceutical companies’ use of
prescriber-identifying data undoubtedly magnifies these problems.
However, suppressing the free flow of prescriber-identifying data to HIOs
and pharmaceutical manufacturers will not solve these problems.
Furthermore, crafting legislation according to the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Sorrell will result only in prescription confidentiality laws
that hinder other parties, such as medical researchers, from accessing the
same information. That result would run counter one of the most
important reasons for enacting prescription confidentiality laws—
promoting public health.
Academic detailers cannot stop pharmaceutical detailers from visiting physician offices, but they can remind physicians of their ability to
opt out of sharing their prescriber-identifying data through the PDRP.
Physicians will likely prescribe fewer expensive, brand-name drugs if
academic detailers inform them of an equally effective, medically
appropriate drug that may be cheaper for patients.
Academic detailing helps states protect physician privacy, decreases
prescription drug costs, and promotes public health better than prescription confidentiality laws. Furthermore, academic detailing will not
hinder medical researchers or public health programs from obtaining
valuable information from HIOs. At a time when unlimited amounts of
data can decrease healthcare costs and increase productivity, and in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell, state legislators should
implement policies supporting academic detailing programs and refrain
from enacting prescription confidentiality laws banning the use of
prescriber-identifying data.
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